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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-4492
________________
CHARLES M. ROBINSON,
Appellant
v.
STANLEY TAYLOR; PAUL HOWARD; THOMAS CARROLL;
BETTY BURRIS; MAJOR HOLMAN; RONALD DRAKE;
Cpl. L. M. MERSON; Lt. GODWIN;
C/O THURMAN STANLEY
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-1202)
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 11, 2006
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed November 7, 2006)

_______________________
OPINION
_______________________

PER CURIAM
Charles Robinson appeals from the order dismissing his civil rights complaint by
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. For the reasons below, we
will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
In August 2004, Robinson filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that Corrections Officer Thurman Stanley made racial comments to him regarding his
religion and also made sexual advances and comments toward him. Robinson alleged
that the remaining defendants did nothing to stop the harassment. Further, Robinson
alleged that Stanely retaliated against him for filing numerous grievances regarding
Stanley’s behavior. Robinson sought injunctive relief (Stanley’s termination) and
damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over a District Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss. See Gould Electronics,
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).
In his complaint, Robinson alleges only that Stanley verbally abused and harassed
him. Robinson does not allege that the remarks and harassment were coupled with actual
physical injury. It is well settled that verbal harassment of a prisoner, although
deplorable, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d
1287, 1291 n.3 (10 th Cir. 2001); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7 th Cir. 2000); see
also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting the Eighth
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Amendment claim of a prisoner who alleged that he “was verbally harassed, touched, and
pressed against without his consent” because “[n]o single incident that he described was
severe enough to be ‘objectively, sufficiently serious.’”). Accordingly, we agree with the
District Court that Robinson failed to state an Eighth Amendment violation against
Stanley.
Robinson also directs his allegations of abuse and harassment to the remaining
defendants, but does not explain how any of these defendants took actions that could be
considered abusive or harassing. A civil rights claim cannot be premised on a theory of
respondeat superior. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Rather, each named defendant must be shown to have been personally involved in the
events or occurrences which underlie a claim. Id. Here, Robinson simply identifies the
defendants by their titles. He does not specifically name each in his statement of the
claim, and refers only to unnamed “supervisors.” Robinson cannot hold these defendants
responsible for the acts of their subordinates simply because of their supervisory
positions. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Finally, Robinson alleges that Stanley retaliated against him after he filed various
grievances about Stanley’s conduct to Stanley’s supervisors. A prisoner alleging
retaliation must show (1) a constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by
prison officials which is sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional
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rights and the adverse action taken against him. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333
(3d Cir. 2001). The District Court concluded that Robinson did not meet the first prong
of this test because filing a grievance is not constitutionally protected conduct. We
disagree. In Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003), we reversed the district
court’s dismissal of a prisoner’s pro se § 1983 complaint, holding that the prisoner’s
allegation that he was falsely charged with misconduct in retaliation for filing complaints
against a prison officer implicated conduct protected by the First Amendment. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit specifically has held that the filing of prison grievances
is a constitutionally protected activity. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352-53 (2d Cir.
2003). Pursuant to Mitchell and Davis, Robinson’s filing of a grievance to complain
about Stanley’s behavior is constitutionally protected conduct, and the District Court
erred in ruling otherwise. Thus, Robinson meets the first prong of the test for showing
retaliation under Rauser. We express no opinion, however, as to whether he can satisfy
the remaining prongs of the test.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court
insofar as it granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Robinson’s Eighth Amendment
claims against them. We will vacate the order to the extent that it dismissed Robinson’s
retaliation claim against Stanley and will remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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